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ofthe study. The subject of this study is representation of companies in
li$t of the first EC-directive on company law. This directive was adopted as
Iago as 1968 but it is still a current directive. Recently (september/october
the SLIM (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market) working group has
recommendations for the simplification of the first and also the second
-directive. The purpose of the SLIM initiative is not to harmonise regulation
irther, but to slim it down.
the starting point of this study is Article 9 of the first EC-directive. This Article
Overs the rules for the status of legal transactions performed by company organs
with regard to third Parties.
Article 9 clause I states that acts performed by company organs will be binding,
even ifthose acts do not lie within the objectives of the company, unless such acts
fansgress the authority that the law confers or allows to be conferred on these
grgans. Thus, the main rule of this Article is that the company is bound through all
the transactions of the company organs, unless such actions are contrary to legal
provisions. The Dutch Supreme Court posed preliminary questions about Article
gclause I to the European Court of Justice in the context of the Mediasafe case. At
the end of 199'7 fhe Court of Justice gave a preliminary ruling in this case. The
Mediasafe case plays an important role in this study. I refer to this case in almost
every chaPter.
The topic of performing actions outside the objectives of a company is dealt
with in the second part of Article 9 clause l. Member states may determine that the
cgmpany is not bound by these actions where such actions breach the objectives of
the company in cases where the company can prove that the third party knew that
the actions were in transgression of the company objectives or, in view of the
circumstances, the third parfy could not have been unaware of this fact; disclosure
ofthe articles of association shall not of itself be sufficient proof of this.
Article 9 clause 2 states that internal limits that have been placed on company
organs, originating from the articles ofassociation or as a result ofa decision by the
c6mpany authorities, cannot be invoked, even ifthey have been disclosed. In the
case of the company organ exceeding the limitations placed on its power by the
articles of association or by the general meeting, the company is still bound with
respect to third parties. Every third party, both those actiong in good faith and those
acting in bad faith, will be protected by the text of this paragraph.
One exeception is possible to the above described- rule that intemal provisions
have no influence on the authority ofcompany organs. This exception covers the
situation where one person, or several people collectively, are given general
representational uthority. Article 9 clause 3 gives the national legislator the
possibility to determine by law that in deviation from legal regulation via the
articles of association, the authority to represent a company may be conferred by
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to a single person or several persons acting jointly. National law may allow such a
provision in the articles to be invoked with respect o third parties on the condition
that it relates to the general power of representation. The question whether or not
such a provision in the articles can be relied upon with respect o third partiesis be
govemed by Article 3 of the first EC-directive.
This study is of a comparative nature. The rules goveming the representation of
public companies and private companies of five member states of the European
Union are examined, namely Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom (of
which only the English law is dealt with) and the Netherlands. The reason why I
have chosen to compaÍe the rules on representation of these five member states lies
in the fact that the societal vision and the socio-economic ulture of these countries
are similar. In these member states, the rules of representation covered by the first
EC-directive have been implemented in national law for more than thirty years'
This makes it possible to compare the development of the national rules of
representation and the textual changes in national legislation on representation
down through the years.
2. Aims of the study. The aims of this study are threefold:
(l) To analyse the rules on representation applicable to public and private
companies, as laid down in Article 9 of the first EC-directive in Germany,
France, Belgium, England and the Netherlands. This analysis hould fumish
material to solve legal questions concerning representation which arise in
the Netherlands.
(2) To judge whether or not Article 9 first EC-directive has been implementd
correctly in the various member states.
(3) Answering the question as to whether or not the implementation of the finl
EC-directive in the member states that have been examined could leadb
the proposal of modifications to Dutch Article 2:1301240 BW.
3. Method of study. Chapter I gives a general introduction to the harmonisation
EC-law. Subsequently the thesis ofthis study is described. The study is dividd
three parts. Part I (Chapter 2) deals with Article 9 of the first EC-directive.
realisation, the contents and the purport of Article 9 first EC-directive
discussed. I derive the genesis of Article 9 of the first EC-directive from the
modifications. For a good comprehension of Article 9, attention is paid to
various opinions on the company representation that existed in the five
states before the implementation of the first EC-direptive.
Part II (Chapters 3-7) contains an analysis of the implementation of
first EC-directive in the national laws of Germany, France, Belgium, England
the Netherlands. These chapters can be read separately. The same topics
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covered in each national legal system. After the description of the provisions
nfrning to representation and the development of these in the relevant member
s6te, thJrestriàtions imposed by the law are subsequently discussed. Examples of
Í,erá r.rt i.tions incluàe legal provisions prescribing a resolution taken by the
general shareholders' meeting before any other organ may act, or legal provisions
irescribing the board of directors requiring the permission of another company
àrgan befoie they may act on behalf of the company. The issuing of shares after the
iníorporation fthe company is illuminated more precisely for each member state'
I selected this legal action because it is covered by the first EC-directive
(representation) as well as by the second EC-directive (Article 25).
iuisequentty, ihe rules governing conflict of interests rules are reviewed with
nfrr.nrc to óvery membei state examined. The subject of conflict of interests has
c'me up for diicussion in a preliminary procedure by the European Court of
Justice. In the Mediasafe-case the Dutch Supreme Court asked if the national
conflict of interests rule (Art.2:1461256 BW) has external significance.
All of the member states examined have endorsed an exception to the rule that
restrictions in the articles or limits arising from a decision of a competent organ
may not be invoked with respect o third parties (Article 9 clause 2, first EC-
directive). On the other hand, if the third party acted in bad faith with respect o the
limited authority of the board of directors or of individual directors, it will not be
protected. The óhapters review what is meant by good faith in the member states
examined.
Finally, I shall go into the topic of company representation by others than the
directors - those acting bY ProxY.
Part III (Chapter 8) contains a comparative synthesis. The implementation of
Article 9 first-Ec-directive in the five member states is compared. I assess whether
or not the implementation in the various member states is in accordance with
Article 9 of the first EC-directive. Special attention is paid to the Dutch rules of
representation. A solution is provided for the current legal questions in the
Nètherlands with respect to the external significance of non-mandatory statutory
limitations. on the bàsis of the results of the analysis of Article 9 of the first EC-
directive and the representation systems in the member states examined, I propose
modifications to Art. 2:1301240 BW -
The present text of Art. 2:1301240 BW is as follows:
,1. 
- The management represents the company to the extent that the contrary does
notfollowfrom the law.
2. - The representative authority shall also vest in every fficer but'
notwithstandiig theforegoing, the articles may provide that it shall uest only in one
or more managing diruitori concurrently with the management. In addition, the
arÍicles *oy proiid, that a director mqy represent the company only with the
cooperation ofone or more other persons
S. - fne representative authority vested in íhe management or in a director shall
be unrestricted and unconditional to the extent that the contrary does not follow
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from the law. Any restrictions in or conditions on the representative.authority
permitted or prescribed by law may only be invoked by the company.
4. - The drticles may also vest representative authority in persons other than
directors'.
4. Proposals to modify Art. 2:130/240 BW.Part III of this study contains everal
proposals for modifications to ArÍ.2:1301240 BW. These have been inspired by
Èngti.tl company law. English company law only provides a framework of
mandatory legislation. A consequence of this is that companies have geat freedom
to divide power between the various company organs. Companies have the
possibility to divide the authority in a way that suits them best. Dutch company law
also gives companies such freedom. As a result of non-mandatory statutory
provisions, companies can diverge from the legal division of powers.
A characteristic element of English company law is the protection of third
parties that deal with a company in good faith. This is laid down in s. 35A(l)
CA 1985. This provision determines that, with respect o a person dealing with a
company in good faith, the power of the board of directors to bind the company or
authorise others to do so, will be free of any limitations under the company's
constitution. Furthermore, the Turquand-rule ensures that third parties acting in
good faith may rely on the authority of the board of directors or of someone
authorised by the board in cases where statutory law requires the permission or the
co-operation of another company organ before the board of directors may enter into
a tra-nsaction. A third party that has dealt with the company through its board of
directors or with someone authorised by the board will be protected as long as he
has acted in good faith. In none of the other member states examined has the good
faith of third parties played such an important role in answering the question
whether or not a company is bound to a transaction. This basic principle brings the
benefit that, in cases of lack of authority on the part of the board of directors or of
someone authorised by the board, third parties acting in good faith are not forcd
to inquire whether or not the required permission or co-operation has been given
In addition, the third party does not have to do research on the company's
constitution.
I prefer a similar representation system. Therefore I make the following
proposals.
Art.2:1301240 should explicitly include the stipulation that the management has thc
power to represent he company, with the exception of the power the law confen
by mandateto another company organ. This concerns the so-called 'absolute laÉ
of authority'. The company is not bound in cases where the board of directm
transgresses this type of mandatory statutory lack of authority.
Art.2:1301240 should also prescribe that the company is bound with respect
third parties in cases where the management or an individual functionary
relative lack of authorilv. This provision covers both mandatory statutory
and non-mandatory stahrtory provisions. Third parties acting in good faith may
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authority of the management or of an individual functionary. As a point of
&parture, they may take the fact that the legally required permission or co-
operation f another company organ has been given. This provision also means
ffat, in cases of non mandatory statutory limitations, third parties acting in good
frith do not have to consult the articles of association or decisions of the general
Sareholders' meeting to find out whether or not the company has deviated from
fre $atutory division of powers.
I also propose the endorsement of the rule of representation that, in cases of
limitations is uing from the articles of association or decisions of company organs
frirdparties acting in bad faith will not be protected. In such a case, the company
isnot legally bound. lt is unnecessary to reverse these legal actions by means oi for
example, unlawful act proceedings.
By stipulating in Art. 2:1301240 BW that only third parties acting in good faith
ueprotected, legal security should be ensured. The criteria for good faith should
be established by law. According to the system of representation of the first EC-
directive, these criteria should lead to the result that only in exceptional cases third
paties are not protected. This occurs, for example, in cases of conspiracy between
the director and the third party or in cases where the third party takes unfair
advantage of the lack of authority of the director to the cost of the company, while
being fully aware of the situation.
Finally I propose modification to Art. 2:1301240 clause 4 BW. On the basis of the
present text of this provision in the Netherlands, it is generally assumed that the
provision i the articles that confers representative authority to persons other than
directors implies limited authority.
This opinion is contrary to Article 9 clause 3 of the First EC-directive. This
$ipulates that the articles may confer representative authority on a single person or
on several persons acting jointly, on the condition that the conferment refers to
general power of representation. Article 9 clause 3 is not limited to directors. In my
view, the representative authority conferred by Art. 2:1301240 clause 4 BW also
refers to general power of representation.
The conferment of such comprehensive power to represent the company by
proxy is no unusual phenomenon. Germany upholds the Prokura-system. In
principle, a Prokurist has unlimited and unconditional power to represent he
company with respect o third parties. The only restrictions on this powers are a few
mandatory limitations. A consequence of such a system is that third parties are
widely protected. Only in a few mandatory exceptional cases is the company not
bound by legal actions of the Prokurist. In France (Art. L. 117 clause 2) and in
England (section 35A(1) CA) mandates conferred by the board of directors also
bestow general representative authority.
With the purpose of establishing the above-mentioned proposals in Art. 2:1301240
BW, the text of these stipulations hould be changed to the following:
'1. The management represents the company. The representative authority does nol
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refer to the powers the law has assigned by mandate to qnother company organ.
2. The representative authority conferred in clause I shall also vest in every fficer
but, notwithstanding theforegoing, the articles may determine that it shall vest only
in one or more managing directors concurrently with the management. In addition,
the articles may determine that a director may represent the company only with the
co-operation ofone or more other persons.
3. The representative authority shall be unrestricted and unconditional with respect
to third parties acting in good faith. Only the company may appeal in cases of
trans gres s ing repre s entative authority.
4. Third parties shall be deemed to have acted in goodfaith, unless the contrary is
proved by the company. A person shall not be regarded as acting in badfaith by
reason only of his lcnowing that an act is beyond the powers of the management or
of an individual fficer.'
5. The articles may also vest representative authority in persons other than
directors. Paragraphs I up to 4 of this article also apply to such representative
authority.'
